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Abstract 
 
Hunger strikes in a custodial setting are complex to manage clinically, with associated legal 
and ethical complexities. Hunger strikes in Irish prisons have received, and are likely to 
continue to be the focus of, considerable media attention. Whilst there is an internationally 
accepted consensus ethical position, there is limited legal guidance available for psychiatrists 
to draw upon in such cases. In this paper, we review recent case-law and discuss the legal 
considerations in the management of prisoners on hunger strike.  
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Introduction 
 
“He has chosen death:  Refusing to eat or drink, that he may bring disgrace upon me; for 
there is a custom, an old and foolish custom, that if a man be wronged, or think that he is 
wronged, and starve upon another's threshold till he die, the Common People, for all time to 
come, will raise a heavy cry against that threshold” 
 (Yeats, 1904, The King’s Threshold) 
 
A “hunger strike” is by definition food refusal as a form of protest or demand (Crosby, Apovian 
& Grodin, 2007). Hunger strikes in prison have been reported in several countries including 
Turkey, South Africa, Ireland and the US Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Crosby, 
Apovian & Grodin, 2007). In Ireland, these came to the forefront of national attention in 1981, 
after the death of 10 individuals protesting against the withdrawal of special category status 
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for paramilitary prisoners by the British Government of the day (Beresford, 1997). Food 
refusal has been noted as a ‘particularly Irish form of protest’ (Governor of X Prison v McD. 
2015). Hunger strikes are relatively uncommon but nonetheless challenging. Recent hunger 
strikes reported by the Irish media have included protests against water charges (Lally, 2015) 
and prison conditions (Governor of X Prison v McD. 2015). Most hunger strikes are motivated 
by political concerns and are self-resolving, and where short term or feigned food refusals 
occur, they are less clinically problematic than sustained refusal of food and fluid.  
 
A psychiatrist is usually called to assess individuals who are refusing food and/or fluid. Their 
role extends to excluding an underlying mental illness and may include assistance in the 
assessment of capacity.  Mental illness, whilst overrepresented in Irish prisons (Kennedy et 
al., 2004) and prisons worldwide (Fazel & Seewald, 2012) is rarely the cause for food refusal 
(Brockman, 1999; Larkin, 1991). Having said that, the psychiatric examination needs to 
exclude causes (Sullivan and Romily, 2009; Brockman, 1999) including, but not limited to 
severe depression wherein an individual is refusing food in order to end their life, psychosis 
wherein an individual may falsely believe their food is poisoned, eating disorders wherein 
there may be a morbid fear of fatness or autism spectrum disorder with associated sensory 
difficulties.  
 
The role of the medical professional in this context is fraught with legal and ethical 
complexities. Guidelines for medical professionals have been drafted (World Medical 
Association, 2006) and suggest a position to adopt ethically.  They favour autonomy over 
beneficence and stress the importance of neutrality of involved physicians, who otherwise 
would be subject to a dual loyalty conflict. They unambiguously state that force feeding of an 
individual with capacity who refuses the same is not acceptable. Key principles relating to the 
role of medical professionals in relation to prisoners on hunger strike as outlined in 
international literature (Gulati et al, 2017; Getaz et al, 2012; Sakelliadis, Spiliopoulou & 
Papadodima, 2009; Brockman, 1999) in keeping with the Declaration of Malta (World Medical 
Association, 2006) agree that the issue of capacity and consent is central to guiding 
management.  
 
Clinicians involved in assessing and treating prisoners on hunger strike should ideally have an 
understanding of capacity related legislation, mental health legislation and a knowledge of 
recent case-law. We aim to summarise these considerations in relation to the jurisdiction of 
the Irish republic.  
 
Case-law 
 
Until recently, there was no Irish case-law on the issue of food refusal in prison while 
precedents from other common law jurisdictions were inconsistent. This inconsistency is 
evident in a series of cases in the US which reached differing conclusions on whether prison 
authorities should be permitted to force feed prisoners against their wishes and contrary to 
their right to self-determination (In re Caulk, 1984; Thor v Superior Court, 1993). More 
recently, there was some US case-law which sanctioned force-feeding of prisoners in 
Guantanomo Bay (Al-Adahi v Obama, 2009; Easton, 2013).  In England, the courts had 
originally stated that prison governors had a duty to preserve the health of prisoners, a duty 
which extended to force feeding. Thus, they were permitted to force-feed hunger striking 
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suffragettes at a time when suicide was illegal (Leigh v Gladstone, 1909).  The crime of suicide 
was abolished by the Suicide Act 1961 but the offence of aiding and abetting suicide was 
retained.  Prison medical staff may have been concerned about possible criminal liability for 
aiding and abetting suicide.  In 1995, it was held that it was lawful for the prison authorities 
not to intervene if a prisoner with capacity was on hunger strike (Secretary of State for Home 
Department v Robb, 1995).  Drawing on an earlier case relating to the withdrawal of life 
sustaining treatment from a young man injured in the Hillsborough disaster (Airedale NHS 
Trust v Bland, 1993), the court declared that death following food and fluid refusal by a 
patient with capacity, is an exercise of self-determination and does not constitute an act of 
suicide.  Therefore medical staff who fail to administer treatment in accordance with the 
patient’s wishes do not aid and abet a suicide.  The court did not have to decide if it would 
have been lawful for the authorities to force-feed the prisoner (Kennedy, 1995).  However, if 
a hunger striking prisoner was also detained under the Mental Health Act and lacked capacity, 
they could be force-fed (R. v Collins ex parte Brady, 2001). The European Court of Human 
Rights has also explored this issue and held that force-feeding a prisoner on hunger strike was 
not a breach of the Convention, provided there was a “medical necessity” and the method 
used was humane (Nevmerzhitsky v Ukraine, 2006).   
 
The legal principles to be applied in Ireland have recently been discussed in the significant 
cases of Governor of X Prison v McD. (2015), Nash v Chief Executive of the Irish Prison Service 
(2015) and A.B. v C.D. (2016).   
 
In Governor of X Prison v McD. (2015), the prison was not seeking to force feed Mr McD., 
instead it was seeking guidance from the court as to whether it was lawful to withhold medical 
and nutritional assistance from Mr McD.  The prisoner had been assessed by a psychiatrist to 
have full capacity, with no mental illness but with borderline personality disorder. Baker J. 
(High Court Judge) issued a declaration that the prison could withhold assistance.  She 
followed the principles in Fitzpatrick v F.K. (2008) in assessing Mr McD’s capacity.  These 
principles include the following: “(1) There is a presumption that an adult patient has the 
capacity, that is to say, the cognitive ability, to make a decision to refuse medical treatment. 
(2) In determining whether a patient is deprived of capacity to make a decision to refuse 
medical treatment the test is whether the patient's cognitive ability has been impaired to the 
extent that he or she does not sufficiently understand the nature, purpose and effect of the 
proffered treatment and the consequences of accepting or rejecting it in the context of the 
choices available (including any alternative treatment) at the time the decision is made…” 
(Fitzpatrick v F.K., 2008).   
 
Having concluded that Mr McD. had full capacity, Baker J. noted that the European Court of 
Human Rights case-law did not mean that failing to forcibly administer food or medicine is a 
breach of human rights (Governor of X Prison v McD., para. 104). Baker J. went on to approve 
of the reasoning of Thorpe J. (High Court Judge, England) in Secretary of State for Home 
Department v Robb (1995), including his emphasis on the competent individual’s right to self-
determination.  It was held that it was well established that an adult person with full cognitive 
capacity is entitled to refuse medical treatment, even if that refusal is likely to inevitably lead 
to that person’s death. While it could not be said that a person has a right to die by suicide, 
the person has a right to freely elect to refuse food, provided his/her choice is full, free and 
informed and he/she does not require assistance to achieve that end (para. 105).  She 
4 
 
distinguished this case from Fleming v Ireland (2013), where it was held that a competent 
person does not have an entitlement to the benefit of assistance to end her life.  Baker J. also 
stated that the prison should respect Mr McD’s advance directive regarding his future care 
(para. 126), for the first time providing a binding ruling on the legal status of advance 
healthcare directives (Mulligan, 2015).     
 
The reasoning in Governor of X Prison v McD. was quoted with approval in Nash v Chief 
Executive of the Irish Prison Service (2015).  In that case, the applicant was reported to have 
been suicidal and had not been eating for a number of weeks.  Kearns P. (President of the 
High Court) noted: “there is no suggestion that the applicant lacks mental capacity to make 
his own decision as to whether or not he wishes to end his life by starvation.” While the 
outcome of the case turned on other issues which are not directly relevant to this article, 
including possible threats to the applicant from other prisoners, the court approved of the 
reasoning in Governor of X Prison v McD and the Supreme Court decision in Creighton v 
Ireland & Ors (2010) to the effect that prisoners may continue to exercise a variety of 
constitutional rights which do not depend on liberty, including the right to bodily integrity. 
The court also clarified that threats of suicide may not be used by prisoners to achieve their 
own objectives: “Any suggestion that prisoners can or should be detained in the prison of 
their own choosing, or avail of hunger strike or suicide threats to secure their own objectives, 
would create chaos in prisons and fatally compromise the proper administration of our prison 
system.”   
 
However, a very different approach was taken by Humphreys J. (High Court Judge) in a more 
recent High Court decision, A.B. v C.D. (2016), which concerned a prisoner, Mr D., who was 
admitted to hospital due to a self-inflicted injury to his neck.  Mr D. was refusing life-saving 
treatment, was reported to have “likely schizophreniform psychosis” and was assessed as 
lacking capacity to refuse treatment.  The hospital sought court authorisation for all necessary 
medical and surgical treatment to protect Mr D’s life and bodily integrity.  Humphreys J. did 
not make an explicit finding as to whether Mr D. lacked capacity on the basis that he did not 
have sufficient information to decide on capacity and the case did not hinge on Mr D’s 
capacity in any event.  Rather, he preferred to decide the case on the question of whether 
prisoners may refuse medical treatment where such refusal would put his/her life at risk and 
thereby, fail to complete the sentence handed down by the court.  The court disagreed with 
Baker J’s approach to prisoner autonomy in Governor of X Prison v McD. for various reasons. 
Humphreys J. analysed US case-law and concluded that the vast majority of US cases find no 
legal violation in forced medical treatment, feeding or nutrition of mentally competent adult 
prisoners.  He also disagreed with Baker J.’s reasoning in McD. as it involved reliance on the 
English case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v Robb (1995) which in turn had 
heavily relied on the unrepresentative Californian case of Thor v Superior Court (1993). 
Ultimately, Humphreys J. made an order compelling treatment as “a prisoner in custody 
under a court order… is not simply entitled to refuse treatments where this would either 
directly or ultimately put his life at risk and thereby frustrate the verdict and order of the 
court” (para. 52), that is, to ensure that a prisoner completes the prison sentence imposed by 
a court of law. 
 
Despite this, Humphreys J. did not disagree with the outcome in McD. as the court had 
granted a declaration that the Prison Governor was entitled to give effect to the prisoner’s 
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wishes not to be fed or treated. Humphreys J. stated: “If a prisoner wants to starve to death 
or die by medical neglect, it is a matter for executive discretion as to whether to allow them 
to do so in all the circumstances: it might be too prescriptive in the modern era to declare a 
positive duty to force-feed a person of full age and capacity in particular, at least in all cases” 
(para.50).  Humphreys J. was also adamant that a prisoner “simply does not have any legal 
entitlement to cheat justice, and the court should not co-operate in him or her attempting to 
do so.”  The approach of the court in A.B. v C.D. is significantly out of line with current thinking 
on autonomy of prisoners in Ireland and is likely to be challenged in later cases.   
 
This case also highlights a matter of complexity wherein courts make decisions based on 
“prisoner” status of an individual (even if the individual is in hospital) as opposed to health 
professionals who view the individual as a “patient”. In their determination, the court must 
be cognizant of the status of the individual as prisoner. Under Irish law the “normal 
constitutional rights [of prisoners] are abrogated or suspended during the period of 
imprisonment…” (State (McDonagh) v Frawley, 1978; Murray v Ireland, 1991; Breathnach v 
D.P.P. & ors, 2001). As such, cases involving prisoners must be approached differently than 
those involving non-prisoners. When considering cases involving prisoners, the court must 
consider whether the rights in question, including the right to self-determination or bodily 
integrity, have been abrogated, suspended or limited for the period of imprisonment. In his 
recent decision in A.B v C.D (2016) Humphreys J. held that while “a prisoner retains the right 
to bodily integrity in prison in the sense that he or she cannot be harmed or neglected by the 
State… it by no means follows from a prohibition on harming prisoners that the prisoner’s full 
rights of autonomy have to be recognised.” A.B. v C.D. (2016). 
 
 
Mental Health Legislation 
 
Mental illness although overrepresented in Irish prisons (Kennedy et al, 2004), is rarely the 
underlying cause for food refusal (Brockman, 1999). If a prisoner has a mental disorder, 
he/she may be transferred from a prison setting to a Designated Centre, currently the Central 
Mental Hospital under s.15 of the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act 2006. Section 3 of this Act 
defines a Designated Centre.  Mental disorder as defined in the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, 
2006 includes “mental illness, mental disability, dementia or any disease of the mind but does 
not include intoxication” (Irish Statute Book, 2006). This is broader than the definition for the 
same concept in the Mental Health Act, 2001, Section 3 of which defines mental disorder as 
“mental illness, severe dementia or significant intellectual disability…”. Once in the 
designated centre, issues of treatment are governed by Part 4 of the Mental Health Act 2001 
(Whelan, 2009).  If the person has capacity, he or she can refuse treatment.  If he/she lacks 
capacity, treatment may be administered under the terms of sections 56-60 of the 2001 Act, 
as amended by the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 2015.  Section 57 of this Act states “The 
consent of a patient shall be required for treatment except where, in the opinion of the 
consultant psychiatrist responsible for the care and treatment of the patient, the treatment 
is necessary to safeguard the life of the patient, to restore his or her health, to alleviate his or 
her condition, or to relieve his or her suffering, and by reason of his or her mental disorder 
the patient concerned is incapable of giving such consent.” 
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There is no reported (the word “reported” being used in a legal context) Irish case-law on the 
question of whether force-feeding constitutes treatment of a mental disorder. However, 
recent cases have been noted in media wherein the High Court has authorized tube feeding 
and ancillary measures for individuals with eating disorders (Carolan, 2015) or severe 
psychotic depression (Carolan, 2014). European and English cases mentioned earlier may be 
of some assistance to any future Irish court faced with this question (See also B. v Croydon 
Health Authority, 1995).  
 
Arguably the case for treatment under Mental Health legislation would not arise in the case 
of a true hunger strike as defined earlier (Crosby, Apovian & Grodin, 2007). However, should 
there be refusal of food as a direct consequence of mental disorder such as a paranoid 
delusion that food is being poisoned as in the case of someone with a paranoid schizophrenic 
illness, or a refusal of food as a suicidal act in the case of someone who is severely depressed, 
or indeed the refusal of food arising from a “morbid fear of fatness” in the case of someone 
with an eating disorder, treatment of the underlying psychiatric condition would be in 
accordance with the principles of consent or provisions of Section 56-60 of the Mental Health 
Act, 2001 as amended by the Mental Health (Amendment) Act 2015. Hence the need to 
differentiate, by a thorough psychiatric evaluation, the concept of food refusal in the latter 
cases from a true “hunger strike” motivated by a demand or protest.  
 
Capacity legislation 
The Assisted Decision-Making (Capacity) Act 2015 has been enacted into law by presidential 
assent on 30 December 2015 but most sections have yet to be commenced (some sections 
from Part 1 and Part 9 were commenced in October 2016). The assessment of capacity would 
be based on the functional test set out in the legislation, rather than the principles from 
Fitzpatrick v F.K. (2008) as outlined earlier. 
The assessment of capacity would be a matter for the attending general 
practitioner/physician who may request psychiatric expertise. In practice, a joint consultation 
may be indicated wherein the physician provides information as to the potential risks of 
prolonged fasting, risks and benefits of treatment and the psychiatrist assists the general 
practitioner/physician in reaching a decision about the capacity. This is not an isolated event 
and good practice would involve gathering collateral information from multiple sources such 
as the prion officers, the prisoner’s family doctor and family members prior to the assessment 
to ascertain the presence or otherwise of mental or physical disorder. The test for capacity 
encompasses evaluating the individual’s ability to understand the information presented to 
him, retain this long enough to make a decision, weigh up the pros and cons of alternative 
courses of action and communicate their decision. The individual should have been advised 
of the likely consequences of their intended action, including the possibility of death and 
keeping in mind, any existing physical illness which may potentially hasten the latter. This test 
for capacity is specific to the matter being assessed and whilst the primary assessment would 
be of the capacity to refuse food and/or fluids, further assessments may be necessary in 
relation to the need for physical health monitoring such as the need for blood tests. The test 
for capacity is also time-specific, and repeated examinations of capacity may be necessary 
and indeed advisable, given the progression of both psychological and physiological changes 
as hunger strikes persist (Fessler, 2003).  
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The 2015 Act defines Capacity as “decision-making capacity” and it is the ability to 
understand, at the time that a decision is to be made, the nature and consequences of the 
decision to be made by him or her in the context of the available choices at that time. Despite 
the fact that this is the first legislative adoption of the functional approach, this approach to 
the assessment of capacity has been used in practice in Ireland already (Health Service 
Executive, 2013; Medical Council, 2016). 
The 2015 Act also proposes three types of decision-making support options to respond to the 
range of support needs that people may have in relation to decision-making capacity. With 
each of the three decision-making support options (assisted decision making, co-decision 
making or a decision-making representative) decisions can be made on personal welfare, 
property and finance or a combination of both (Department of Justice and Equality, 2015).  
Following the decision in Governor of X Prison v McD. or once this law is enacted, under the 
Assisted Decision Making (Capacity) Act, an individual with capacity could make an advance 
refusal of treatment in case of deterioration in health following food refusal. Treatment, in 
the presence of a valid directive would then be illegal. However, in the case of a prisoner, this 
is less clear given the decision in A.B. v C.D. (2016). Based on the reasoning in that case, while 
the state is not mandated to force-feed prisoners, it is entitled to authorise force feeding 
against the wishes of a prisoner with capacity or a prisoner with a valid advance healthcare 
directive in order to fulfil the court order, that is, to ensure he/she completes the prison 
sentence. 
 
Conclusions & Discussion 
Psychiatrists in the prison setting may find themselves in a clinically, ethically and legally 
complex situation when faced with someone on hunger strike. The role of the psychiatrist in 
assessing prisoners on hunger strike is not limited to the diagnosis and treatment of mental 
illness but extends to assisting the assessment of capacity to refuse food as well as the 
motivation behind the hunger strike (Getaz et al, 2012; Brockman, 1999). From a clinical 
perspective, an interagency and multidisciplinary approach with regular case conferences 
may be helpful to guide decision making. 
Whilst there is a consensus governing the ethical position (Gulati et al, 2017; World Medical 
Association, 2006), we discuss, in this paper, the relevant case-law and legislation, including 
the Criminal Law (Insanity) Act, Mental Health Act and the new Assisted Decision Making 
(Capacity) Act that the Irish prison Mental Health Practitioner can draw upon in practice. With 
changing capacity legislation, there will likely be additional case-law to refer to in the coming 
years.  
In practice however, most prison hunger strikes are short lived (Garcia-Guerrero & Vera-
Remartinez, 2015) and, where they persist, and in particular, in complex circumstances 
wherein there is no mental illness but issues around capacity, the prison mental health 
practitioner may wish to seek legal advice from solicitors for the health service and their own 
medical indemnity organisation given the limited and complex national case-law existent at 
this time.  
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